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SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
FOR THE SOLUTION EXISTENCE 
IN GENERAL COALITION GAMES 
MILAN MARES 
The concept of the general coalition game was suggested in [2]. Here we are interested in 
a few sufficient conditions under which the strongly stable solution of such game exists. It is 
especially shown that the classical concept of the convex game can be also generalized for our 
coalition game model, and that it guarantees the existence of the solution. Besides that a few 
other sufficient conditions are presented. It is also shown that the convexity and superadditivity 
concepts defined here really generalize the classical ones known in the side-payments coalition 
games theory. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
As the general coalition game model includes some more special types of games 
as its modifications, it is useful to derive some conditions under which there exists 
a stable solution of a game in the sense of [2]. 
The main purpose of the presented paper is to show that the notion of the convex 
coalition game, known in the side-payments games theory, can be generalized up 
to the level of the general coalition game. Moreover, it keeps its most useful property, 
namely the ability to guarantee the existence of a strongly stable solution. This 
result is completed by a few other statements of rather similar type. 
It is also useful to remember the classical Scarf's generalization of the balanced 
game concept. This is done in this paper, and it is noted that it can be used for 
a large class of the general coalition games. 
The formal definition of the superadditivity and convexity used here substantially 
differs from the one known in the theory of the side-payments coalition games with 
the von Neumann characteristic function. It is shown in the last section of this paper 
that the dissimilarity is purely formal, and that both definitions are equivalent 
on the class of the side-payments games. 
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1. GENERAL COALITION GAME 
The notion of general coalition game was suggested in [2], where also some 
of its elementary properties were derived. It was also investigated in some further 
papers among which [4] is relevant for this work. In this section we briefly remember 
the necessary definitions and present a few auxiliary results useful in the following 
parts of this paper. 
In the whole paper we denote by R the set of all real numbers. The general coalition 
game (or briefly the game) is a pair (I, V), where J is a non-empty and finite set and V 
is a mapping associating any subset K of / with a subset of the real space R1 and 
preserving the following properties for any K <= I. 
(1.1) V(K) is a closed subset of R'; 
(1.2) if x e V(K), y e R', yt = x; for all ieK, then also yeV(K); 
(1.3) V(K) + 0; 
(1.4) V(K) = R' iff K = 0 . 
The elements of the set 1 are called players, its subsets are coalitions and its partitions 
into non-empty disjoint coalitions are called coalition structures. The real-valued 
vectors from R' are called imputations and the sets V(K), K c J. represent the sets 
of all imputations achievable by the coalition K. The mapping V of 2' into the class 
of subsets of R' is called the generalized characteristic function. 
If x = (x,)ieI e R', y = (j',),er e R' are imputations and K c / is a coalition then 
we say that x dominates y via K and write x dom^ y iff 
xi = yt for all ieK, 
x{ > yt for at least one ieK. 
It is useful for the further explanation to define for any coalition K c / the set 
(1.5) V*(K) = 
= {y e R' : there does not exist any x e V(K) such that x domx y} = 
= {y e R' '.for any x e V\K) there exists an i e K such that xt < yh 
or Xj = yj for all j e K} . 
The sets V(K) n V*(K) for all K c / represent the imputations that are achievable 
by the coalition K and that are not worse than any other achievable imputation. 
In this sense, they are important for the definition of the solution concept. The neces-
sary and sufficient condition under which the intersection V(K)nV*(K) is non-empty 
was presented in [3]. More important for the existence of a solution is the sufficiency 
of V(K) n V*(K) briefly investigated in this section. 
We say that the set V(K) n V*(K) is sufficient iff for any imputation x e V(K) — 
- V*(K), x e V*({i}) for all i el, there exists an imputation y e V(K) n V*(K) such 
that y dom^- x. 
252 
Remark 1. Let K 4= 0 be a coalition and let us denote by dV(K) the boundary set 
of V(K). Then always 
V(K) n V*(K) a 3V(K) and V(K) u V*(K) = R1. 
Remark 2. If the coalition K is empty then obviously V*(K) = V(K) = Rl. 
Lemma 1. If K * 0 and V(2C) n V*^) = dV(K) then the set F(K) n F*(K) is 
sufficient. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from (1.1), (1.4), (1.5) and Remark 1. 
If x § V*(K) then there exists y e V*(K) such that y domK x, and it can be chosen 
in such way that y e dV(K). • 
Lemma 2. LetK cz / be a coalition and let for any 
xe(V(K)-V*(K))n(C)V*({i})) 
is I 
be the set 
V(K) n-lyeR1 : yt ^ xt for all ieK} n R
K 
bounded. Then the set V(K) n V*(K) is sufficient. 
Proof. Let us choose an arbitrary xeV(K) - V*(K), xeV*({j}) for all jel, 
and an i e K. Then there exists z e dV(K) such that Zj = Xj for all j eK, j 4= /, 
and z ; ^ x;, and such that for all z' e W
7, z' = xy for all j eK, j 4= /, zj > z;, the 
relation z ' e f l ' - F(X) holds. If - 4 V(K) n F*(i?) then we choose another j e K, 
j 4= /, and repeat the procedure. After a finite number of steps, we construct y e dV(K) 
such that for all i e K the relations y e V*(K) and y{ > x ; hold. As x £ V*(K) there 
necessarilly exists ieK such that x ; 4= j ^ ; and consequently ydomKx. • 
Lemma 3. Let K cz I and let us suppose that for any x e V(K), x e V*({*}) for all 
i e I, and for any / e K there exists y e V*(K) such that .y; = Xj for all j e i , j 4= /. 
Then the set V(K) n F*(X) is sufficient. 
Proof. It is not difficult to verify that the set V(K) satisfying the assumptions 
of this lemma fulfils also the assumptions of Lemma 2. • 
One of the important notions of the coalition games theory is the notion of super-
additivity. For the general coalition games it was formulated and investigated in [4], 
We say that a game (I, V) is superadditive iff for every pair of disjoint coalitions 
K, L c /, K n L = 0, the following inclusion holds 
(1.6) V(K uL)z3 V(K) n V(L) . • 
Lemma 4. If V*(K u L) <= V*(K) n V*(L) for every pair of disjoint coalitions 
K, Lcz I, K n L = 0, then the game (I, V) is superadditive. 
Proof. Let us suppose that there exists an imputation x e V(K) n V(L) such that 
x$ V(K u L). Then xe V*(K u L) by Remark 1. As the set V(K u L) is closed, 
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its complement R' — V(K u L) is open and there exists an open neighbourhood 
U(x) of x such that U(x) e R' - V(K u L) c F*(£ u L). Let us choose j e J7(x) 
such that j'j- g Xy for all j eK KJ L and j>, < x ; for some ieK u L. Then at least 
one of the relations x domx y and x domL j holds. As x e V(K) n V(L) then j £ V*(K) 
or y$ V*(L). Hence, j $ V*(K) n V*(L) and y e V*(K u L) by its construction. 
It is a contradiction with the assumed inclusion, and the game (I, V) is necessarily 
superadditive. • 
As a solution of the general coalition game we shall define any imputation achiev-
able by some coalition structure and undominated by any other achievable imputation 
via any coalition. Exactly formulated; an imputation x e R1 is said to be strongly 
stable iff there exists a coalition structure j f such that 
(1.7) xepiV(K) 
KeUT 
and x e V*(L) for all coalitions L <= /. The coalition structure JC is called a strongly 
stable coalition structure iff there exists a strongly stable imputation x e R1 such 
that (1.7) holds. 
Lemma 5. If (/, V) is a superadditive game and if x e R1 is a strongly stable imputa-
tion then x e V(l) and the coalition structure {/} containing exactly the all players 
coalition is strongly stable. 
Proof. The statement follows from the definition of superadditivity immediately 
if we take into account that any coalition structure Jf" is a subpartition of / into 
disjoint coalitions and hence 
fl V(K) «= V(I). D 
KeX 
The existence of the strongly stable imputations represents the main subject 
of this paper. A few elementary results of that kind were already obtained in [2], 
and some other concerning rather special types of games were presented in [4]. 
2. CONVEX GAMES 
Convexity is an important property of some coalition games with side-payments. 
Its importance follows from the fact that it implies the existence of the non-empty 
core (c.f. [8]), and that it also represents a natural game theoretical model of some 
propertirs of markets (c.f. [6]). In this section we define the convexity concept for 
the general coalition game model and prove that it implies the existence of strongly 
stable imputations that are a generalization of the elements of core as it is shown 
in [2]. 
We say that a general coalition game (I, V) is convex iff for every pair of coalitions 
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K, Lc I and every pair of imputations 
x = (xt)M e V(K) n V*(K nL), y = (j/()(e, e V(L) n V*(K n L) , 
any imputation ze R1 such that 
z ; = x , , for i e i £ , 
Z; = yt, for ie L- K , 
belongs to the set V(K u L). 
This definition is not graphically very similar to the classical definition of the 
convexity, known for example from [8] or [5]. The logical equivalence of both 
concepts for the side-payments games is shown in Section 5 of this paper. The follow-
ing auxiliary results make these two definitions at least partially more similar. 
Lemma 6. If a game (/, V) is convex then for every pair of coalitions K, Lc I 
the following inclusion holds 
V(K) n V(L) n V*(K n L) c V(K u L) . 
Proof. If we chose x = y e V(K) n V(L) n V*(K n L) and construct zeR1 
according to the definition of convexity then yt = xt = zt for i e K u L, and z e 
e V(K u L) as follows from the convexity assumption. • 
Lemma 7. Every convex game is superadditive. 
Proof. The statement immediately follows from Lemma 6. If the coalitions K and 
L are disjoint then V*(K n L) = R1 by (1.4), and the superadditivity inclusion is 
obvious. • 
It is possible, now, to introduce the main result of this section. 
Theorem 1. Let (7, V) be a convex game and let all the sets V(K) n V*(K), K c I, 
be sufficient. Then there exists at least one strongly stable imputation in (/, V). 
Proof. We shall prove the theorem by induction. The assumptions as well as 
the statement are obviously fulfilled for any one-player game. Let us suppose that 
the theorem is true for a game (J, V), where J c I and V is naturally reduced on 
the class of subsets of J. Let us denote by x' e RJ the strongly stable imputation 
in (J, V). As the game is convex and then also superadditive, Lemma 5 implies that 
x' e V(J). Moreover, 
x £ V(J) n V*(J) and x'eV*(L) for all L c L 
Let us choose iel — J, denote M = J u {;']• and construct x e RM such that Xj = x'j 
for all ;' e J, and xt is such that x e V(M). Such construction is possible as the game 
is superadditive by Lemma 7, and V(M) => V(J) n V({i}). Then x e V(M) and 
xeV*(L) for all Lc J. Let us suppose that x$V*({i}). Then there exists x" e 
eV({i}) nV*({i}) such that x" dom{ij x, i.e. x" > x;. It means that x"eV({i}), 
x" e V*(9) = V*(J n {i}), and x e V(J), x e V*(0) = V*(J n {i}) (c.f. Remark 2). 
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Let us construct z' e FSM such that 
z'j = Xj for all j e J , 
Then, according to the convexity assumption, z' e V(M) and, moreover, z'j > Xj 
for allj e M. If z' i V*(M) then by the sufficiency assumption there exists z e V(M) n 
n V*(M) such that 2 domM z'. Then 
2 e V(M) n V*(M), z e V*(L) for all L c J , - e V*({i}). 
Let us prove now that z e V*(K) for all K c M, too. Let us suppose that z <£ V*(/C) 
for some X c M. Then necessarily i 6 K. As ze V(K) - V*(K) there exists y e V(K) 
such that y domK z, i.e. ^ Si zy for all j e K. It means that y e V*(L) for all L cz J 
including y e V*(J n JC). The convexity assumption implies that the imputation 
« 6 RM such that 
Uj = z ; for j e J - K , u} = ^ for j eK , 
belongs to the set V(M) and moreover « domM z. It is a contradiction with the fact 
that z e V*(M), hence, z e V*(X) for all K c M. As also z € F(M), it is strongly 
stable in the game (M, V), where Vis considered on the class of subcoalitions of M. • 
Theorem 2. If. (/, V) is a convex game where all sets V(K) n V*(K), K c /, are 
sufficient, then the coalition structure {/} containing exactly the coalition of all 
players is strongly stable. 
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 immediately. • 
3. OTHER SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
In this section we shall prove two sufficient conditions for the existence of strongly 
stable imputations. As it is obvious also from the technique of their proofs there 
exists certain similarity between them and the convexity condition presented in the 
previous section. 
Theorem 3. Let (/, V) be a game, let the sets V(K) n V*(K) be sufficient for all 
coalitions K c /, K =# 0, and let for any triple of coalitions H, M, N c I such that 
N=>M,Nr\H = 0, the following inclusion holds 
V(M u f l ) n V*(M) n V*(N) c V(N u H). 
Let further for every xeV(M) there exists yeV(N)n V*(N) such that yt = xf 
for all i e M. Then there exists a strongly stable imputation in (/, V). 
Proof. The statement will be proved by induction. It is obviously true for any 
one-player game. Let us suppose now that it is true for a game (J, V) where J c I 
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and V is considered on the class of subcoalitions of J. Let us suppose further that 
x e RJ is the strongly stable imputation in (J, V), and choose i e I - J, G = J u {;'} 
and yeRa such that y} = x} for all j 4= i. As x e V(j) then the last assumption 
of the theorem implies that y can be chosen in such a way that y e V*(G) n V(G). 
Because xe V(J) and Xe V*(L) for all La J, the same is true for j>, as well. It is 
necessary to show that y e V*(K) for K cz G such that i e K. Let us suppose that there 
exists K cz G such that y <£ V*(K). It means that there exists z e V(K) such that 
z domA- y and, moreover, z} = y} for ;' e K. Then z e V*(L) n V(JC) n V*( J ) where 
L= K — {i} and, by assumption, ze V{G) where we have put H = {i}, N = J, 
M = L. But it means that z domG y and there is a contradiction with j e V*(G). 
It means that j must be a strongly stable imputation in the game (G, V). • 
Theorem 4. Let (/, V) be a game, let for every pair of coalitions M, N cz I, such 
that M cz N, the relation V(M) n V*(iV) c F(7V) holds. Let further for every x e 
e F(M) there exists y e V(N) n V*(N) such that j ; = xt for all ; e M. Then there 
exists a strongly stable imputation in the considered game. 
Proof. The proof is rather analogous to the one of Theorem 3. The statement is 
obviously valid for any one-player game. Let us suppose that it is true for a game 
(J, V) where J cz I, and that x is the strongly stable imputation in (J, V). Let us 
choose iel - J and denote G = J u {;'} and y e Ra such that ys = x} for all 
j e J. It is possible to construct y in such a way that y e V(G) n V*(G) as follows 
from the second assumption of the theorem. Then y e V(G) n V*(G) and y e V*(L) 
for all Lcz J. Let us suppose that y £ V*(K) for some K cz G where i e K. Then 
there exists z e V(K) such that z domK y and moreover Zj = y} for all j e K. Then 
Z£ V*(G) n V(i£) and, by assumption, z e V(G) as well. It contradicts the fact that 
y e V*(G). Hence, y e V*(K) for all K c G. • 
Remark 3. The last assumption of the previous Theorem 4 implies that every set 
V(K) n V*(K), K CZ I, is sufficient in the considered game. It can be easily verified 
if we put M = N. 
4. A FEW NOTES ON THE BALANCE 
The concept of the balanced sets and balanced games is the crucial one in the theory 
of the side-payments coalition games, as follows from [ l ] or [7]. Every side-payments 
coalition game is balanced if and only if it has non-empty core, i.e. iff there exists 
a strongly stable imputation in it. Even if this equivalence is not generally true in case 
of more general games, the condition of the balancedness is still sufficient for the 
existence of strongly stable imputations in a wide scale of games as follows from 
Scarfs paper [6]. The Scarfs result is of a principal character also for the gene-
ral coalition games investigated here, and it is useful to mention a few comments 
on it. 
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Scarf had investigated the coalition games without side-payments described by the 
pair (I, V) where / is a finite set of players and V is a characteristic function fulfilling 
conditions (l . l) , (1.2) and also the following one 
(4.1) For any coalition structure Jf the set 
(nV*({i}))n(nV(K)) 
is bounded. ,e ; ***" 
Remark 4. It is easy to prove analogously to Lemma 2 that for every x e R' such 
that x e V*({i}) for all i el, and for every K c I such that x e V(K) - V*(K) there 
exists an imputation y e V(K) n V*(K) fulfilling the relation y domA- x, whenever 
(4.1) is valid. 
When our considerations are concentrated to the strong stability of imputations 
then we are interested in the imputations that belog to all sets V*(K), K a I, only. 
It means that condition (4.1) and Remark 4 do not really limit our possibilities to 
derive the properties of the strongly stable imputations. 
Assumptions (1.3) and (1.4) are not mentioned in the Scarfs paper explicitly. 
However, they are completely natural and they are implicitely presumed also in [6], 
Namely the condition V(K) + R' for K =j= 0 follows from (4.1), the validity of (1.3) 
for the Scarfs game is selfevident from the sense of [6], and empty coalitions are not 
relevant for the problems solved by Scarf. 
It means that the Scarfs result is applicable for a wide class of general coalition 
games fulfilling (4.1). The result represents a generalization of the Bondareva's 
classical theorem on balanced games with side-payments proved in [1]. However, 
in case of games without side-payments the balancedness is only sufficient but not 
necessary condition for the existence of the strongly stable solution. 
According to Scarf, a class of coalitions Jl,Jl cz 2', is balanced iff there exist 
non-negative constants 8K for K e Jl such that for each i e I 
X 5K = 1 , where Jtx = {Ke Jl: ieK] . 
KeJli 
The general coalition game (I, V) is balanced iff for every balanced set of coalitions 
Jl the inclusion 
f| V(K) c V(I) 
KG. II 
is fulfilled. The main result of Scarfs paper [6] is valid also for general coalition 
games in our sense. 
Statement (Scarf). There exist strongly stable imputations in every balanced 
coalition game (I, V) fulfilling (1.1), (1.2) and (4.1). 
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5. GAMES WITH SIDE-PAYMENTS 
Some of the concepts used in the previous sections, namely the superadditivity and 
convexity of games, were originally introduced in the theory of the side-payments 
coalition games. As their formal definitions used in this paper rather differ from the 
classical ones, it is useful to prove their equivalence. 
We say that a game (I, V) is a side-payments game iff for every coalition K <= /, 
K 4= 0, there exists a real constant vK such that 
(5.1) V(K) = {xeMI:YJ
xi = ^}-
ieK 
For K = 0 we define vK = 0, and it is obvious that the equality V($) = R
1 does 
not contradict (5.1). 
It is easy to verify that for any K c / , K + | , 
(5.2) V*(K) = {x e If: £ x ; 5; vK} , 
ieK 
and an imputation x e R1 is strongly stable in the side-payments game (/, V) ilf there 
exists a coalition structure Jf such that 
(5.3) Y,XI = VK for all Ke:/f , 
ieK 
and 
(5.4) X xt = *L f ° r aH L <= I • 
ieL 
If the game (/, V) is also superadditive then (5.3) turns into 
(5.5) I x ; ^ v, 
iel 
as follows from Lemma 5. 
Lemma 8. In the coalition games with side-payments the sets V(K) n V*(K) are 
sufficient for all K c / , K 4= 0. 
Proof. Relations (5.1) and (5.2) imply that for any non-empty coalition K cz J 
V(K) n V*(K) = dV(K) = {x e « ' : X *,- = »*} • 
ieK 
Then the statement follows immediately from Lemma 1. • 
The equivalence of the classical definitions of the superadditivity and convexity 
and the corresponding ones used in this paper is proved by the following two theorems. 
Theorem 5. If (/, V) is a coalition game with side-payments and if K, L cz 1, K n 
n L= <D, then 
V(K) n V(L) cz V(K u L) o vK + vL S vKuL . 
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Proof. Let V(K) n V(L) c V(K u L) and let x e R1 be such that 
E xf = "K , E xi = "L • 
isK iEL 
Then x e V(K) n V(L) and, consequently, x 6 V(K u L). It means that 
«KuL ^ E *. = E Xi + E Xi = VK + VL . 
ieKuL ieK ieL 
Let vK + vL <; % u L and let x e V(K) n F(L). Then 
Y Xi = HXi + Y,Xi= VK + VL ^ VKuL > 
ieKvjL ieK ieL 
and x e V(K u L). • 
Theorem 6. Let (/, V) be a coalition game with side-payments and let K, La I 
be coalitions. Then the following three statements are equivalent. 
(a) The convexity condition is fulfilled. 
(b) V(K) n V(L) n V*(K n L) c V(K u L). 
(c) »* + vL - vKnL g vKuL. 
Proof. The implication (a) => (b) follows from Lemma 6. Now, we shall prove 
(b) => (c). Let us suppose that 
(5-6) oK+ vL- vKnL > vKuL . 
Coalitions K and L are necessarily such that K — L + 0 and L — K + 0, as in the 
opposite case, e.g. in case K a L,vK = vKnL and vL = oXuL and (5.6) cannot be true. 
It means that it is possible to choose x e R1 such that 
E Xi = H . E *. = "K , E Xi = "KnL • 
ieL ieK ieKnL 
Then 
Z Xi = Y,Xi + Y,Xi- E *i = »L + VK - VKnL > vKuL • 
ieKuL ieL ieK ieKnL 
It means that 
x e V(K) n V(L) n V*(K n L) and x £ V(X u L) . 
Consequently, if (c) is not true then (b) cannot be true as well, and the implication 
(b) => (c) is proved. The last implication to be proved is (c) => (a). Let us choose 
imputations 
x e V(K) n V*(K n L) , ye V(L) n V*(K n L ) , 
and construct ze R1 such that 
z ; = x ; for ieK, z ; = yt for ieL— K . 
Then - e F*(X n L) , 
E zi - E zi = E zi = E .v. = E .v. - E J7.- . 
isL i e l n i ; i sL-K ieL-K ieL ieLnK 
Y.Xi^VK, E J'i = "i > E J*." = VK^L > 
ieK ieL ieKnL 
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and consequently 
i z. = ;>>. + i > . - i -.= 
i s / fu i teX i'eL ieKnL 
= S Xi + 2 ^ ~ £ >'>' = % + "L - %nl ^ «W • 
IEK IEL ieKcL 
It means that 2 e V(K u L) and the game is convex. • 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
A few sufficient conditions for the existence of the strongly stable imputations 
in general coalition games were presented in the preceding sections. Together with 
the more elementary results introduced in [2] they cover quite a wide class of coalition 
games in which the existence of the strongly stable imputations and consequently 
of the strongly stable coalitions can be tested. 
The general coalition games represent an adequate mathematical model of a rich 
class of cooperative situations. Consequently, the strongly stable solutions corre-
spond to the rational outcome of the behaviour in such situations, and it is useful 
to know some conditions under which such rationality may be achieved. 
The applicability of the results presented above is supported by the fact that many 
of the assumptions used here (e.g. the sufficiency of V(K) n V*(K), the superadditivity 
or the balance) characterize coalition games derived from real applications of the 
general theory (cf. [5], [7] and others). 
(Received September 10, 1984.) 
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